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2 FLEX CROPS & COMMODITIES 
THE EMERGENCE  
OF FLEX CROPS  
AND COMMODITIES
Contemporary agrarian transformations are shaping and 
being shaped globally by a complex and dynamic mix of 
interests and concerns around food security, energy/
fuel security, climate change mitigation, the recent global 
financial crisis, and rising demand for natural resources 
and commodities from traditional hubs of capital (primar-
ily North Atlantic), but also increasingly from the BRICS 
countries and some middle income countries (MICs), which 
represent emerging centres of international capital.3 
One notable, yet still underexplored dimension of the 
current era is the rise of “flex” crops and commodities: 
crops and commodities that have multiple uses (food, feed, 
fuel, industrial material) that can be, or are thought to be, 
flexibly inter-changed. These include, but are not limited to 
soya (feed, food, biodiesel), sugarcane (food, ethanol), oil 
palm (food, biodiesel, commercial/industrial uses) and corn 
(food, feed, ethanol). These may be considered, to date, 
the most prominent and established “flex crops”, although 
others are appearing or have the potential to appear on the 
horizon, including cassava, coconut, beets, rape seeds and 
sunflower. Other commodities are starting to follow such a 
path too, for example, trees for timber, pulp, biomass, ethanol 
(from woodchips) and for carbon sequestration purposes.
Although still emerging, the rise of flex crops and commod-
ities seems to address, or at least partially address, one of 
the most pressing and costly challenges facing agriculture: 
increasing price volatility in world markets. Flex crops seem 
to deal with this challenge by reducing uncertainty in a single 
crop sector through diversification of the product portfolio, 
thereby enabling investors to better anticipate and more nimbly 
react to changing prices in either direction—e.g., to better 
exploit price spikes or to better withstand price shocks. 
With the emergence of (or speculation about) relevant markets 
and in some cases the development and availability of technol-
ogy (e.g. flexible mills) that enable, or will potentially enable, 
maximization of multiple and flexible uses of these crops, 
diversification can be achieved within a single crop sector. 
When sugarcane prices are high, sell sugarcane. When ethanol 
prices are high, sell ethanol—or at least this is what is gener-
ally assumed to be the idea driving flex crops. When the actual 
market for biodiesel is not there yet, sell palm oil for cooking oil, 
while waiting for (or speculating on) a more lucrative biodiesel 
market that has yet to emerge. Or at least sell palm while wish-
ing for a more profitable scenario to happen, perhaps building 
a storyline about this projected scenario to jump-start some 
business undertaking, e.g. to raise investments, lure investors, 
entice governments, persuade affected communities and or-
chestrate favourable media attention to achieve some of these 
requirements. In a sense, flexing means that product lines can 
be narrowed without compromising allocative efficiency. 
This is taken further by reconceptualising agriculture 
as a source of biomass for a future bio-economy. The 
bio-economy agenda seeks extra flexibilities from mainly 
non-food biomass in global value chains. Biomass denotes 
renewable raw materials, which can be readily decomposed 
and recomposed in more profitable ways (Birch et al., 2010, 
Levidow et al., 2013). According to European Union (EU) 
lobby groups, the bio-economy is the “sustainable production 
and conversion of biomass into various food, health, fibre 
and industrial products and energy” (Becoteps, 2010). 
This means horizontally integrating several industries.
The agenda promotes flexibility of biomass feedstocks—their 
sources, types, conversion processes and end products. A 
central means of doing this would be an “integrated, diversified 
biorefinery—an integrated cluster of industries, using a variety 
of different technologies to produce chemicals, materials, 
biofuels and power from biomass raw materials” (Europabio, 
2007). Strategies seek a competitive advantage for companies 
becoming “backward-integrated” into multiple feedstocks and 
flexibly converting them into multiple products. “The newly 
established value chain will have room for non-traditional part-
nerships: grain processors integrating forward, chemical com-
panies integrating backwards and technology companies with 
access to key technologies, such as enzymes and microbial 
cell factories joining them” (World Economic Forum 2010: 20). 
As envisaged in this agenda, future biorefineries would 
enable more flexible uses of current conventional crops. 
Some crops also are being redesigned for biorefineries, e.g. 
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for easier breakdown of cell walls or higher-value chemicals, 
whereby plants become “green factories” for producing new 
compounds (ETP “Plants for the Future” 2007). Alongside 
the interests of commodity traders to achieve a compet-
itive advantage, R&D investors have strategic interests 
in intellectual property from GM crops and GM microbes 
producing enzymes for biomass conversion processes. 
For developing flex crops and commodities, a future  
bio-economy has also become a major R&D agenda within the 
European Commission (EC). During 2007–13 its Framework 
Programme 7 allocated more than €60m to future biorefineries. 
In its current 7-year successor, Horizon 2020, the bio-economy 
agenda is extended, e.g. for “renewable oil crops as a source of 
bio-based products”, towards “broadening the range of suitable 
oil feedstock candidates with optimally-lowered resource 
inputs and developing economically viable and sustainable, 
eco-friendly and bio-based products”. Going beyond imag-
ined flexing (as above), future bio-economy visions mobilise 
investment and policy support to help realise such a future. This 
agenda serves as an economic imaginary, portraying private 
interests as a common societal interest (Levidow et al., 2013). 
THE IMPORTANCE OF 
UNDERSTANDING AND 
STUDYING FLEX CROPS  
AND COMMODITIES
Profound changes in the agrarian world can been seen from 
various perspectives, including the changing food regime 
and enclosures (McMichael 2012), environmentalism and 
enclosures—or “green grabbing” (Fairhead, Leach and 
Scoones 2012), financialization of agriculture and the food 
system (Isakson 2014, Fairbairn 2014, Clapp 2014), the 
politics and political economy of the rise of biofuels (Franco 
et al. 2010; Borras, McMichael and Scoones 2010), and water 
grabbing (Franco et al. 2013, Mehta et al. 2012). Each of these 
perspectives offers new and important ways of looking at 
the profound restructuring of the world’s agriculture. The 
production, circulation and consumption of some crops and 
commodities—and the links between them—are being recast.
There is nothing new about the fact that most crops and 
commodities have multiple uses. For example, coconut is 
produced by small-scale farmers for household consumption 
as food, alcohol brew, and as feed for farm animals. But what 
we are pointing out and would like to explore more deeply 
here is the phenomenon of the global commercial expansion 
of flex crops along the lines of the very specific purposes 
provoked by the current convergence of multiple crises. 
Climate change, peak oil, the current level of meatification of 
diets, unprecedented expansion of the global transportation 
sector, and the phenomenal rise of the BRICS and MICs, are 
all very significant contextual changes—and are all relatively 
recent. Altogether they comprise the defining features 
of the current generation of flex crops and commodities. 
Thus, for example, the first generation of sugarcane ethanol 
(e.g. Brazil and Germany in the 1970s) was triggered by 
the early 1970s oil crisis due to the OPEC embargo. On the 
other hand, the current generation of ethanol is largely, 
though not solely, triggered by climate change mitigation 
strategies and/or a realisation of peak oil, two narratives 
that were not in place in the 1970s. But to what extent this 
contemporary reconfiguration of new, multiple and flexible 
crop uses is occurring remains to be researched empirically. 
Deploying a conventional framing in our research, public action 
and policy advocacy only somewhat address the above flex 
issues and so may be ineffective. Sweeping statements about 
the relationship between the rise of the biofuel complex and 
the aggressive expansion of oil palm plantations worldwide 
only partly explain this expansion. While there is much policy 
justification on palm oil expansion built around the biofuel 
narrative, non-biofuel products from palm oil plantations 
remain more important in quantity and value in the world’s 
leading producer countries (namely, Indonesia and Malaysia) 
or in a start-up country such as Colombia or Guatemala—at 
least for the time being. A narrow focus on the biofuel–plan-
tation link weakens policy analysis and public action. Capping 
importation of biofuels into the EU or imposing environmental 
and labour standards, in order to minimize plantation expan-
sion and prevent dispossession and displacement of people 
elsewhere, may only lead to selling palm oil more as non-bio-
fuel products like cooking oil to China, India and Pakistan—as 
is currently so for Indonesian palm oil (Borras and Franco 
2011). Looking at the livestock sector in China in the context 
of the soya complex is useful but incomplete. Likewise 
looking at trees and forests solely for their conventional use 
for paper, while blind to the rising speculation on new or 
anticipated markets for biomass and ethanol as well as for 
carbon credits (Kroger 2014) misses a key part of the picture.
Understanding the changing power configuration of transna-
tional companies (TNCs) in the context of their conventional 
sectors, e.g. oil and car companies or fossil fuels, remains 
important, but has become increasingly insufficient in today’s 
context where TNCs seem to be increasingly interested 
and engaged in flex crops and commodities. For example, 
Volkswagen and Shell have become increasingly interested 
in biofuels. Unilever has a long-standing interest in palm oil 
for food and other cosmetic products and is increasingly 
interested in the biofuel policy debate and investment—but 
from a different perspective. The global rush to various biofuel 
feedstocks that are among the crops for Unilever’s main 
business interests, e.g. palm and coconut oil, may be threat-
ening the company’s corporate interests because of actual or 
potential competition from other buyers of biofuels. This may 
be a likely reason why Unilever emerged as one of the critical 
voices against biofuels, at least against the first generation 
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feedstocks, and among the advocates of next generation 
biofuels that avoid food-competing feedstocks. Moreover, 
examining (inter)national regulatory institutions, instruments 
and principles based on a traditional sectoral approach, which 
analyses food, fuel, feed, and others in regulatory “silos”, will 
remain relevant but has been rendered largely insufficient with 
the rising popularity of flex crops and commodities. How does 
one regulate palm oil, which has multiple and flexible uses? 
Should it be a concern for the food, fuel or industrial sector?
The current massive expansion of the oil palm sector world-
wide is indeed premised on the rise of the biofuels complex. 
Our hunch is that this expansion is actually correlated to 
the rise of multiple uses of palm oil, largely induced by the 
convergence of multiple crises and the various responses to 
it. It is most likely that there are several, not singular, reasons 
why the oil palm sector has dramatically ballooned recently. 
These include: the rise of biofuels; dramatic demands for 
cooking oil and other vegetable oil-based food and non-food 
products that have witnessed a dramatic spike in demand 
from newer middle class enclaves worldwide; and the need 
for newer, more lucrative and safer investment sectors for 
finance capital. Altogether these are the likely reasons for 
the rise of palm oil as a mighty, popular vegetable oil. It is, in 
part, a direct outcome of the global restructuring of agri-food 
production, circulation and consumption, and the regulatory 
institutions and processes in these interconnected spheres.
Whether or not crop uses can be switched and can be 
switched easily, the feasibility and degree of flexibility is 
another matter, and is the more complex and challenging 
dimension of this phenomenon. The multiple-ness and flexi-
ble-ness of some key crops and commodities have rendered 
the political economy of particular crops more complex to 
research. In turn, it has rendered social movements’ political 
advocacy work around particular crops more complicated. But 
simplification of an increasingly complex issue—by continuing 
to deploy conventional concepts and analytical lenses—in 
terms of academic research and political advocacy work is 
increasingly becoming problematic. The challenge is how to 
understand these transformations and dynamics, and how 
to research them in order to better inform public actions and 
policy advocacy work by state and civil society organizations.
THE DUAL CONCEPTS  
OF “MULTIPLE-NESS”  
AND “FLEXIBLE-NESS”
There are two dimensions of these crops and commodities 
that are very similar and overlapping but are distinct from 
each other. The distinctness of and the interaction between 
these two dimensions are crucial to our understanding 
of flex crops. These dimensions are the “multiple-ness” 
and “flexible-ness” of crop and commodity uses.
The “multiple-ness” of crop  
and commodity uses
Most of these crops and commodities potentially have multiple 
uses. Many of these crops have actual multiple uses. Coconut, 
for example, has always been referred to in the Philippines as 
the “tree of life” because every part of the coconut tree and 
the coconut itself has an important use and commercial value. 
Producing alcohol from most of the popular ethanol feedstocks 
today, such as sugarcane, cassava and corn, has always been 
part of a long tradition of villagers producing their own alcohol 
and fuel from these crops. Of the current popular feedstocks 
for biodiesel perhaps only jatropha does not have the chemical 
potential for multiple uses because it is toxic to animals and 
human beings. Arguably, one of the principal reasons for the 
rather quick boom and bust cycle of jatropha, despite massive 
hype,4 is that it is not materially conducive to multiple uses. 
While there is nothing particularly novel about crops having 
multiple uses, the contemporary agricultural restructuring 
explained above has resulted in the emergence of new 
additional uses that previously were not thought to be 
possible—at least technologically and commercially. Dating 
back a couple of decades or so, soya has been a relatively 
recent boom crop that is associated with the rise of the global 
meat complex (Weis 2013). The soya oil by-product may 
have seen increased market demand with the expansion of 
the vegetable oil market worldwide, including in China. The 
most recent commercially significant by-product for soya 
is perhaps biodiesel. Sugarcane has multiple food-oriented 
uses, and is also famous for jump-starting modern day 
bioethanol in the 1970s. Corn is a classic crop with multiple 
uses: sweetener, livestock feed and ethanol. Palm oil has been 
a popular vegetable oil for cooking and other foodstuffs. But 
by-products from producing palm oil—palm kernel cake, palm 
oil sludge and palm pressed fibre—are increasingly important 
commercial animal feedstuffs, and so as biodiesel from palm 
oil. Coconut’s latest important commercial product lines come 
from coco coir. In light of climate change mitigation strategies, 
coco coir has become a popular commodity for soil condition-
ing, soil erosion control and slope stabilization, in addition to 
cocowater (for health issues), and biodiesel (cocodiesel).
There are new aspects of the emerging contemporary uses 
of these crops and commodities. First is the orientation of 
emerging uses that are associated with issues linked to newer 
political economy related to changing dietary preferences, es-
pecially the growing preference for animal protein and animal 
products, and public health concerns, as well as socio-eco-
logical narratives around climate change, which spur a search 
for renewable resources and energy. Second, the sources of 
demands for these commodities are more diffuse and global, 
rather than just being concentrated in a particular hemispheric 
corner or particular consuming social class—although the de-
mands from the BRICS and MICs are remarkable. For example 
the dramatic increases in the production output of livestock 
products and sugarcane ethanol in Brazil were matched by 
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dramatic increases of consumption of these products domes-
tically (Wilkinson and Herrera 2010). Third, the quantity of de-
mands for these commodities globally, in absolute terms, has 
witnessed dramatic increases during the past decade or so. 
Quantitative indicators in terms of area harvested, production, 
trade and value are important measurements. They tell us 
about current conditions and trends in a particular crop sector. 
This set of quantitative measurements remains important 
in understanding the rise of flex crops and commodities. 
However, it has inherent limitations in capturing emerging, dy-
namic and fluid political economic conjunctures around these 
crop and commodity sectors. If we base our analysis solely on 
what percentage of palm oil production actually went to bio-
diesel production and consumption, we will be able to capture 
the actually existing quantity of traded biodiesel output (and 
its monetary value)—but not the indirect but quite crucial link 
between biodiesel and the expansion of oil palm plantations 
worldwide. It is quite probable that policy narratives and trade 
talks about biofuels were enough to convince national govern-
ments and corporate investors to push for massive expansion 
of the sector, even though there is not yet a fully developed 
biodiesel market. Their actions might have been principally 
inspired by the thought of a lucrative biodiesel market world-
wide and they can afford to wait for that market to grow in the 
near future because in meantime they can sell their palm oil in 
various commodity forms: cooking oil, cosmetic material and 
other commercial-industrial commodities. Thus, if we quantify 
the percentage of palm oil that already went to the biodiesel 
market, it is most likely not as much as the projected biofuel 
market. This is the case in Indonesia where most of palm oil 
is still traded for other purposes besides biodiesel. However, 
all these conjectures are based on “informed guess work” on 
our side. These issues require systematic empirical research.
Hence, the emergence of a new type of multiple-ness of 
crop and commodity uses also necessarily alters the way we 
research the political economy of these crops and commodities 
and the manner we carry out our policy advocacy. We cannot 
rely solely on quantitative measurements of these products to 
examine political economic trends and meanings. This forces 
us to look more deeply and carefully into the political economy 
of these crops, along the four fundamental questions outlined 
by Henry Bernstein (2010): Who owns what? Who does what? 
Who gets what? What do they do with the wealth created?
Altogether what this shows is that the multiple-ness of crop 
and commodity uses are both old and new, and the signifi-
cance of this recent development cannot be taken for granted. 
The character, extent and trajectory of, as well as the demand 
for these new types of multiple uses, linked to the old uses 
of these crops and commodities, may have resulted, or may 
result, in important changes in the patterns of production, 
circulation and consumption of these products, and that of 
others—and in how we understand these transformations. For 
one, it has altered old and created new routes of commodity 
circulation and sites of consumption. It has also drawn a much 
wider array of gatekeepers into the process of commodity 
circulation such as food, energy, fuel, biotechnology, car 
and livestock companies, among others (Franco et al. 2010), 
including finance capital such as investment banks, hedge 
funds, and so on (Fairbairn 2014, Isakson 2014, Clapp 2014).
The new-ness of some additional uses of these crops and 
commodities is not the end of the story. In some instances, 
it might only be the beginning because it brings us to the 
related concept of “flexible-ness”. We now turn to this issue.
The “flexible-ness” of crop  
and commodity uses
A crop with multiple uses is quite valuable; a crop with multiple 
flexible uses is even more so. If a crop or commodity use 
can be switched from one specific purpose to another with 
technical ease and with attractive economic return, then it is 
not difficult to imagine the important transformation of such 
a crop or commodity and the far-reaching political economic 
implications when its multiple-ness meets flexible-ness.
Obviously for a crop to become a flex crop should have at 
least two main uses; the more uses it has the more room 
there might be for flexing. Crops with a single principal use 
are less attractive in the contemporary context, unless the 
agronomic, technical and economic conditions for producing 
such a crop outweigh the conventional risks associated with 
a single crop–single use/commodity. As we briefly mentioned 
above, in our view, this is one of the reasons for the hype and 
the quick boom–bust cycle of jatropha. There are no known 
major commodity products or uses for jatropha other than 
biodiesel. But crops with multiple uses do not automatically 
have sufficient basis for flexibility. In our initial estimate, 
there are at least three minimum conditions for crops and 
commodities with multiple uses to become flex crops, namely, 
material basis, technological possibilities and profit viability.
First is the material basis. There are some feedstocks for next 
generation, non-food-based biofuels that are being developed 
for single use: grass, algae, jatropha, among others. There are 
multiple uses that are not switchable because of the chemical 
and physical constitution of products. A soya meal or a copra 
meal or a palm kernel cake has few other uses except as 
animal feed principally and food consumption secondarily. 
But soya oil, corn oil, coconut oil, and palm oil have multiple 
uses—and these semi-processed products can be flexibly 
used—at least in terms of their chemical constitution. For 
example, coconut oil can either be used as cooking oil or 
cocodiesel. Indeed, there are many crops and commodities that 
have the material basis for multiple flexible uses: sugarcane, 
palm oil, soya, corn, coconut, cassava, sugar beets, sunflower, 
rapeseeds, castor and wood chips. Some have more multiple 
uses than others, and thus have better prospects for multiple 
flexible uses. Compare palm oil with castor for example. 
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Two related issues are of relevance. On the one hand, there 
are crops and commodities that have by-products that can 
easily be developed into important commodities in the current 
changed context. This is the case of soya where due to the cur-
rent global political economy of livestock, the main product is 
soya meal, while soya oil has become the by-product. But this 
oil can be directed towards food uses or it can also be trans-
formed into biodiesel. It is the reverse for coconut: the oil is the 
main product (for food and biodiesel uses) and the copra meal 
is the by-product (for animal feed). There is a better potential 
for multiple flexible uses in crops with important by-products. 
On the other hand, as agribusiness continues to develop tech-
nology towards more efficient crop and commodity production, 
it is likely to lead towards the emergence of crops and com-
modities with less—not more—multiple uses. At least this is the 
case of hybrid corn that is meant not for human consumption 
but for animal feed, in addition to being a feedstock for ethanol. 
Whether this will happen in other crops is something to watch 
out for. In our calculation, when this happens, the possibility for 
multiple flexible uses is reduced, but not completely eliminated.
Second is the technological possibility. One of the reasons 
why jatropha was quite popular initially was the fact that the 
technological requirement to transform farm gate produce into 
oil is inexpensive and easily installed even at the household 
level. The seeds can be pressed easily for immediate use. 
Different crops and commodities have varying technological 
possibilities. Ethanol plants are generally more complex than 
biodiesel ones. Among ethanol feedstock, sugarcane and 
corn require quite complex processing plants (Wilkinson 
and Herrera 2010, Gillon 2010). Crops like coconut and palm 
oil on the other hand present relatively less of a challenge. 
Technological capacity allows for the possibility and/or 
ease of crop and commodity flexing. But variation between 
countries regarding the current conditions for key crops and 
commodities in terms of technological possibility is one of 
the key empirical questions that need to be researched.
Third is profit viability. Even when a crop has the material 
basis and the technological capacity is possible and/or 
available, flexing may not happen if it makes no business 
sense or if the technology is simply unaffordable. This is a 
concern in some ethanol sectors where updated food–ethanol 
flexible plants can have very prohibitive costs, such as those 
in the sugarcane and corn sectors. Meanwhile, where a 
cheap substitute commodity exists, it will also render flexing 
for a crop infeasible. For example, palm oil and coconut are 
comparable crops in terms of multiple uses and potential for 
flexing, but palm oil remains generally cheaper than coconut, 
partly explaining the popularity of palm oil and not of coconut.
Our hunch is that where all three key requirements —material 
basis, technological capacity and profit viability—are available 
in favourable ways, the chances for flexing are high. This has 
to be validated empirically, of course. But in our initial analysis, 
these three minimum conditions do not operate in a political 
vacuum. They are shaped in the political economic context of 
contestations around property, development and control of 
technology, how a labour regime is shaped, and how political 
power is exercised in society. Class formation and dynamics 
in society will influence whether these minimum conditions oc-
cur, and, if they do, how. State policies also play a critical role 
in determining whether these three minimum conditions are 
met, including public investment in R&D, agricultural subsidies 
and trade policies. However, there are cases where there is 
potential for crop use switching, but for some socio-economic 
and political reasons actual flexing may not occur or may 
become publicly unpopular especially if it comes up against 
a polarized food-versus-fuel dilemma. This is the case of 
corn, at least at some point a few years ago. Alternatively 
there might be cases where switching uses occurs despite 
non-viable economic terms, as partly demonstrated in the 
debates about the efficiency of US corn ethanol (Gillon 2010).
In short, multiple uses do not necessarily lead to flexible 
uses. Our sense is that the expanding uses of certain crops 
and commodities influence and transform their patterns of 
production, circulation and consumption. In cases where 
flexing is possible and desirable, the popularity of relevant 
crops and commodities may increase dramatically. Whether 
this actually happens is highly dependent upon finance capital’s 
willingness to gamble on said commodities. In the contempo-
rary era of financialization, the unique qualities of flex crops 
may make them a particularly enticing sponge for investors 
who are awash with surplus funds. We now turn to this topic.
FINANCIALIZATION  
AND THE RISE OF  
FLEX CROPS
Interlinked with the contemporary food, fuel and economic 
crises, financialization is among the various processes that 
have likely contributed to the rise of flex crops and commod-
ities. In general terms, financialization refers to the growing 
importance of financial motives, actors and markets in the 
operations of economies and their governing institutions 
(Epstein 2005). It is often understood as a recurring feature of 
capitalism, wherein profits increasingly derive from specu-
lative activities rather than the trade and production of actual 
commodities (Arrighi 1994, Krippner 2011). The most recent 
phase of financialization emerged as a response to a crisis of 
overaccumulation in the 1970s. Faced with insufficient demand 
for their products and declining profits, US and European 
enterprises redirected their surplus capital from productive 
activities to financial markets (Arrighi 1994, Harvey 2010). 
Finance capital has sought refuge in various activities in the 
subsequent decades—including technology stocks, foreign 
currency and housing—producing a series of speculative 
bubbles. Most recently, it has targeted the food and agricultural 
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sector, speculating on activities all along the agro-food supply 
chain (Isakson 2014). This section considers how the financial-
ization of food and agriculture has shaped and been shaped 
by the production of flex crops. Our argument is that the 
multiple uses of flex crops have the potential to mitigate risk 
on investments while maximizing returns, thereby rendering 
them a particularly attractive target for financial speculation. 
Among the various financialization-induced changes to 
agro-food provisioning, the impacts upon commodity prices 
have received the most attention. Flex crops play an important 
role in this story. The prices for several emblematic flex 
crops—including palm oil, maize, soya, sugar, timber and 
coconut oil—have increased dramatically since the onset of the 
contemporary financial crisis in 2006. In real terms, prices for 
these crops remain at or near thirty-year record highs.5 These 
increases are likely both the cause and result of financializa-
tion. As several scholars have documented, the recent spikes 
in—and subsequent volatility of—agricultural commodity 
prices cannot be explained by underlying market fundamentals 
(Ghosh et al. 2012, Clapp 2009, 2014, Spratt 2013, Gilbert 
2010). Instead, they point to the dramatic increase in specu-
lative activity in commodity futures markets over the past 
decade. Whereas orthodox economic theory and the so-called 
“efficient markets hypothesis” suggest that conditions in the 
markets where actual commodities are traded will guide prices 
in futures markets (i.e. futures markets are accurate predictors 
of real world conditions), these scholars have documented a 
“contango” effect, wherein financial speculation in agricultural 
futures markets determines the prices of physical commodities 
in spot markets. The result is that speculative bubbles in fu-
tures markets have transmitted to actual spot market prices for 
a number of commodities, including prominent flex crops like 
maize and oil seeds (Pradhananga 2013, Gilbert 2010, Palm 
Oil HQ 2009). Of course, speculative exuberance has inflated 
the prices of a variety of commodities, not only flex crops. 
Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, the rising prices 
of flex crops have attracted financial interest in other arenas 
beyond futures markets. First, however, it is worth considering 
why financial capital might have a special interest in flex crops.
Financial capital may be particularly attracted to flex crops 
because their multi-functionality helps to negate the purported 
trade-off between risk and yield on investments. As noted 
earlier, investing in crops with diverse uses is akin to diversi-
fying one’s portfolio. A single crop is demanded by markedly 
different sectors, thereby ensuring a minimum number of 
buyers and mitigating risk. In other words, the fact that flex 
crops can be sold in multiple markets ensures the liquidity of 
investments, or the ability to easily convert them to cash, mak-
ing them particularly attractive to investors seeking a “flight to 
quality” during the economic downturn. In the contemporary 
context, the multiple-ness of flex crops not only helps to ensure 
a minimum demand from a given sector, but oftentimes 
promises a growing overall market demand and, correspond-
ingly, a rising price. More than having many uses, prominent 
flex crops like maize, oil palm, soybeans, trees and sugar 
are each posited as a solution to a number of crises—food, 
energy, climate—that afflict contemporary society. Whether 
real or imagined, the idea that a particular flex crop is a silver 
bullet that can solve such vexing problems feeds the notion of 
spectacular and sustained yields. Consider a recent article in 
Moneyweek entitled, “Palm oil is set to boom: you should buy in 
now” (Stevenson 2012). Palm oil “has a wide—and growing—
variety of uses, both food and industrial”, the author observes. 
“And”, he continues, “it could be about to surge in price”. 
He implies that strong demand from the food and industrial 
sectors renders oil palm a safe investment while growing de-
mand for alternative fuels promises spectacular returns in the 
short-run and a “longer-term bull market” (Stevenson 2012).
As the author from the Moneyweek article observes, there 
are multiple ways that investors can speculate on flex 
crops. While they can “dabble in the futures market”, he 
encourages buying shares in plantations where there is a 
possibility of capturing value from multiple stages of the 
value chain (Stevenson 2012). A cursory investigation 
suggests that there are plenty of opportunities for investors 
to buy into flex crop enterprises. The funds raised through 
such initiatives seem primarily intended to acquire farmland 
and, importantly, to invest in the mills and refineries that 
could potentially enhance the enterprises’ ability to flex—or 
determine how a particular crop is utilized. Provisioning 
credit and insurance represents a third channel through 
which financiers can tap into the expanding flex crop sector. 
The rise of flex crops cannot be disassociated from the 
“financialization of everyday life”, or the growing role of credit 
and debt in the social reproduction of agrarian households 
(Rankin 2013, Martin 2002). With the neo-liberal dismantling of 
the Keynesian welfare state and the consequent emergence of 
the contemporary “debtfare” state, rural development has in-
creasingly been construed as financial inclusion (Soederberg 
2012, 2013). States no longer play a key role in the provisioning 
of agricultural inputs, rural infrastructure or risk management. 
Instead, farmers who are now dependent upon modern 
technologies are expected to acquire them on credit. The role 
of the state and other development actors is to facilitate poor 
peoples’ access to loans (Soederberg 2013). Of course, credit/
debt is a double-edged sword that can both empower and 
constrain borrowers. The conditions attached to loans, and 
more generally financial inclusion, can be used to discipline 
farmers, typically limiting their production to approved crops. 
Given the potential of flex crops to minimize risks while 
maximizing returns lenders are likely to structure farmers’ 
land-use practices accordingly. In Guatemala, for instance, the 
state and other actors have identified oil palm production as a 
catalyst for pro-poor development in the country’s impover-
ished northern lowlands. Small-scale farmers—at least those 
who have managed to retain their land (see Alonso-Fradejas 
2013)—are encouraged through political, social and economic 
means, to take loans and cash advances to acquire the inputs 
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and technical knowledge for cultivating African palm that 
they subsequently sell to specified palm oil enterprises on 
a contract basis. The initiative has not only contributed to 
the dramatic expansion of oil palm production in the region, 
but also to small farmer debt (Guereña and Zepeda 2013).
The financialization of everyday life has also permeated the 
management of agricultural risk. Whereas agriculture has 
always been risky, the dangers have been accentuated by the 
environmental uncertainty associated with climate change 
(Ribot 2014) and volatile commodity markets (Ghosh 2010, 
Clapp 2009). In the absence of moral economies and state 
support, farmers are left to independently manage risks. For 
financiers, the rising uncertainty that has accompanied the 
privatization of agricultural risk represents a new avenue for 
speculation. They have promoted a variety of financial instru-
ments that purportedly help farmers mitigate risk, including 
the increasingly prevalent instrument of micro-insurance 
aimed at small-scale producers.6 Yet, like credit, insurance 
is only offered for specified crops, namely those on which 
underwriters are willing to gamble. The ability to mitigate risk 
through flexing may mean that insurers are more partial to 
crops with multiple uses. In short, even as the financial sector 
profits from selling credit and insurance to farmers, they may 
also be pushing farmers to cultivate flex crops. Their ability 
to do so is augmented by the fact that many lenders require 
borrowing farmers to acquire crop insurance. This practice 
is particularly prevalent among micro-lenders who require 
borrowers to obtain policies from micro-insurers. This, how-
ever, is mostly speculation. The extent to which different forms 
of agrarian finance shape land-use practices and whether 
there is a bias for flex crops warrants further research.
REAL, ANTICIPATED  
OR IMAGINED: AN INITIAL 
TYPOLOGY OF CROP AND 
COMMODITY FLEXING
When the material basis, technological capacity and profitabili-
ty are present, there are great possibilities for flexing. But there 
may also be some situations where either or both techno-
logical or profitability may not really be there, yet the idea of 
flexing is nevertheless invoked but for various purposes other 
than real crop and commodity flexing. Even where the three 
minimum conditions for flexing do not occur or are unobtain-
able, just conjuring the idea of flex crops and commodities 
is sufficient to trigger a real-world chain of events that can 
have far-reaching implications for agrarian transformation.
As we have mentioned above, we are interested in the politics 
of the actualization of the multiple commercial uses of crops 
and commodities as well as the possibility of flexing. For the 
purposes of this paper, by flexing we mean at least three broad 
types, which are best analysed in their intersection with each 
other, rather than by approaching them separately like “silos”.
The first type is real flexing. By real flexing we mean that there 
is a material and logical basis for flexing and actual flexing 
occurs. For example, with the mandatory blending of 2 per 
cent for coco-diesel in the Philippines and a corresponding 
set of tax incentives for coco-diesel production and trade, 
a number of coconut oil millers and traders quickly filled in 
the blending requirement by shifting the final destination of 
their coconut oil from the traditional vegetable oil and other 
markets to the domestic coco-diesel market. The technological 
and investment requirements for flexing seem to be easily 
achieved (compared to the much larger requirement for 
building a sugarcane ethanol plant, for example). Within just 
a matter of three years, the millers and traders were lobbying 
to increase the mandatory blending cap to 5 per cent because 
of over-supply of domestic coco-diesel. This case represents 
a situation where it is relatively easy to switch the ultimate 
use of coconut oil. If and when sugar cane millers are able 
to control whether to crush their sugarcane for sweetener 
products or ethanol depending on price signals and/or 
subsidy/tax, real flexing can actually occur. This is the same 
in palm oil, canola, sunflower, sugar beets, corn or cassava.
Real flexing may be triggered by a series of related crop-use 
changes. For example, when canola oil that was predomi-
nantly used for food purposes was suddenly used to produce 
biodiesel, as in Germany—partly in order to produce biodiesel 
domestically—this shift left some market gaps where it was 
previously used in the food sector. This subsequent market 
gap could then be filled by imported palm oil. The two types 
of oil in this context then are tightly intertwined (Franco et al. 
2010). In a way, these vegetables oils are “fungible”, in the 
way described by McMichael (2010). Meaning, you could have 
switched oils for both purposes, at least hypothetically speak-
ing. The actual politics and economics of this are empirical 
matters that need to be investigated rather than assumed.
What we know at the moment based on initial, largely 
anecdotal evidence is that various crops and commodities 
are really being flexed. To what extent this actually occurs, 
how this actually happens and what factors encourage/
discourage, facilitate or block real flexing from happen-
ing in one sector vs. another, or from one geographic 
setting to the next, are all empirical questions that ought 
to be investigated more carefully—and urgently.
The second type is anticipated flexing. What we mean by 
this is that there is no actual flexing that is happening, but 
there is significant anticipation of or speculation about such 
activities based on a clear material and logical basis. As 
explained earlier, deals for major investments, including 
large-scale land acquisitions and investment pledges are 
usually achieved on the basis of the dual ideas of multiple 
uses for crops and commodities and the possibility of flexing. 
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The Procana sugarcane ethanol company was able to 
secure 30,000 ha of land in southern Mozambique largely by 
projecting the rosy picture of multiple crop uses of sugarcane, 
including crop flexing for ethanol and other bioethanol-based 
commercial products such as “green plastics”. However, 
the first few years of operation of Procana saw only the 
production of conventional sweetener products, not ethanol. 
It had to close a few years after getting started, sometime in 
late 2011, having failed to mobilize sufficient investments in 
Europe. It was not able to build the much-vaunted Brazilian 
flexible sugarcane mills (Borras, Fig and Monsalve 2011). In 
the north of Mozambique an industrial tree plantation (largely 
pine) has gained ground.7 The investors are from Sweden, 
in alliance with the Dutch pension fund company, ABP. The 
motivation behind the investment is for the conventional timber 
and pulp. However, in both the narratives of the government 
and the investors, the ideas of biomass and wood chips 
for ethanol are being seriously floated as reasons why the 
investment will be lucrative. At the same time, the entire tree 
plantation is also thought to be developed and transformed 
into a REDD+ project site (FIAN 2012, see also Kroger 2014).
In these two Mozambican examples there has been no real 
flexing. But flexing was, and is, an important aspect of the gov-
ernment and corporate narrative. It has material basis, sounds 
logical, legitimate and convincing. It is an anticipated flexing. 
What these examples show however is that anticipated or 
speculated flexing—even before it is realized, if at all—can al-
ready have concrete and far-reaching impacts on the lives and 
livelihoods of real people. Ethanol was never produced in the 
Procana plantation, but the anticipation or speculation about 
such production nevertheless transformed pre-existing social 
structures and institutions in this part of Mozambique, even 
after Procana pulled out in late 2011. Woodchip-based ethanol 
was never produced from Niassa forests, and is unlikely to be 
produced. The REDD+ project is also unlikely to take place. 
Yet narratives about ethanol and REDD+ continue to provide 
logic, legitimation and traction for corporate investment.
In short, flexing does not have to be real and happening for it to 
have important impacts—and for it to be taken seriously. Its sig-
nificance is felt even when it is just anticipated or speculated.
The third type is imagined flexing. By imagined flexing we 
mean flexing that is not real, not actually happening and has 
no material or logical basis, yet it is invoked for some reason. 
While it has elements similar to anticipated or speculated 
flexing, the key difference is that the latter has material, 
logical and legitimate basis for anticipation; imagined flexing 
does not have these elements.
An example is the case of big landed elites in the sugarcane 
sector in the central Philippines. Land reform in the Philippines 
has been on going since 1988, with a chequered history, 
but has delivered some partial success (Borras 2007). One 
of the remaining bastions of resistant big landlords is the 
sugarcane sector where the hacienda system inherited 
from the colonial times has persisted into the twenty-first 
century. There are a number of legal loopholes in the land 
reform law that landlords persistently exploit to evade land 
redistribution (Franco 2012). One loophole protects “corporate 
farms” that are plantations run in a highly capitalized manner. 
Alternatively, other modalities of reform used to be allowed, 
such as a stock distribution option. When the National Biofuels 
Policy was passed in 2006, sugarcane producing landed elites 
immediately claimed that they were converting their haciendas 
into flexible operations, producing sugarcane sweeteners and 
ethanol, invoking the capital-intensive nature of ethanol mills 
as the basis for exempting their estates from the land reform. 
Some of them even invoked the noble idea of biofuel being 
part of the needed climate change mitigation strategies thus 
warranting support. A close examination of these landlords 
would likely show that they are incapable of such dramatic 
recapitalization and that a modernizing and entrepreneurial 
character is not a feature of conventional feudal sugarcane 
landlords in the central Philippines. Instead, landlords 
continue to avoid land reform and invoking an imagined 
flexing has been added to their repertoire of narratives.
Stepping back and looking at the big picture, it is not difficult to 
speculate that these three types of flexing can and do co-exist 
in a given place and time—in parallel with, contradicting or 
complementing, facilitating or undermining one another. It 
is highly political. The points of intersection between these 
various types, and their implications are critical areas for 
empirical investigation. The factors that encourage, discour-
age, facilitate or hinder flexing are not just chemical-physical 
and technological—they are very much political. To what extent 
these three types manifest in different settings and in various 
crop and commodity sectors is one of the unknowns that need 
to be researched more empirically, extensively and carefully.
RECASTING THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF FLEX CROPS 
AND COMMODITIES
The political economy of flex crops and commodities—based 
on Bernstein’s four questions—is necessarily recast in several 
ways, eight of which are: (1) changed multiple sites and 
levels and increasingly long-distance interconnectedness; 
(2) new owners of capital and technology; (3) continuity 
and change in the organization of production and emerging 
labour regime; (4) new commodity producers and traders; 
(5) new range of consumers; (6) crop-use and land-use 
change; (7) the role of the state; and (8) the evolving role 
of international regulatory institutions. It is important to 
examine these in interrelated categories to understand 
the character, pace, scope, trajectory and implications 
more broadly of the rise of flex crops and commodities.
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Changed multiple sites and levels and increasingly long-dis-
tance and complex interconnectedness. Although the specifics 
need empirical investigation, it is clear that the new aspects 
in the multiple-ness of crop and commodity uses have partly 
altered the sites and levels of production, circulation and 
consumption of these commodities and/or other key com-
modity routes, A good example is sugarcane ethanol where 
Rotterdam and Singapore (their ports and financial districts, 
to be specific) have become important transit points for this 
traded fuel, although their ultimate origin may likely be Brazil. 
The outflow of Indonesian palm oil is going to places that 
include China, India and the EU, but with different product 
lines and consumption contexts. In the EU palm oil partly 
filled the market gap for food use left by the conversion of 
rapeseed oil to biodiesel. There might also be an increasingly 
long-distance and complex interconnectedness between 
these sites of production, circulation and consumption. For 
example, Indonesian palm oil traded for food use in China 
is intertwined with the anticipated or imagined biodiesel 
market in the EU. These changed sites and character of 
interconnectedness have become important dimensions of 
the political economy of these crops and commodities.
Owners of capital and technology. The production of flex 
crops and commodities is generally capital intensive, al-
though there remain significant variations. As mentioned 
earlier, perhaps ethanol plants for sugarcane and corn are 
the most expensive to build and operate. Key to maximizing 
the multiple flexible uses of these crops and commodities 
is the ownership and control of processing technologies. 
This is where non-agrarian elites come in. Perhaps most 
especially the industrial bourgeoisie and international/finance 
capital may work in alliance or competition with agrarian 
elite classes (recall our discussion earlier in the section on 
financialization). Depending on the history and pre-existing 
agrarian structures and institutions, this may erode—or 
reinforce—traditional landed classes in agrarian societies.
Organization of production and emerging labour regimes. The 
organization of production of these crops and commodities 
is marked by continuity and change. Traditional organization 
of production that has generally been based on monocultures 
and/or large-scale plantations in combination with strategic 
processing plants has generally remained the same in most 
of these sectors. However, we are also witnessing important 
varied tendencies: incorporation of small oil palm growers as 
suppliers of palm fruit through a variety of contracts, shrinking 
share of commercial family farms in the land area in the US 
Midwest, proliferation of land lease arrangements particularly 
in the sugarcane sector in Brazil and some variants of this in 
the soya sector of Argentina, namely, the “pools de siembra” 
(see McCarthy 2010, Gillon 2010, Fernandes et al. 2010, 
Murmis and Murmis 2012, respectively). While monocultures 
and the incorporation of processing technology and plants are 
quite common in contemporary organization of production, 
the rest can vary quite widely. Companies will explore various 
modalities as long as they gain control of resources and profit. 
Thus, there is a significant incorporation of family farms in the 
emerging value chains, whose farm sizes can vary widely: 
from a three ha oil palm farm in Malaysia to a 3,000 ha corn 
farm Iowa. While monocultures and industrial large-scale 
plantations are generally labour-saving enterprises, some 
arrangements are labour-intensive, e.g sugarcane cutting 
work in Brazil, as well as oil palm plantations in Indonesia. This 
is not to say that the conditions and terms of incorporation are 
desirable, especially since the Brazilian sugarcane sector is 
infamous for the slave-like conditions faced by cane cutters. 
And observers argue that the optimistic estimates of the labour 
absorption capacity of the Indonesian oil palm sector are 
inflated (Li 2011). Nevertheless, relative to smallholder-based 
agriculture with little mechanization, industrial monocultures 
generally expel or save more labour than they absorb.
Commodity producers and traders. Commodity producers 
remain varied, ranging from large-scale industrial agribusi-
ness companies to smallholder producers, and diverse other 
types in between. We see this in soya, sugarcane, oil palm, 
corn and even tree production. But most of the smallholder 
producers are subordinated to the larger agribusiness 
conglomerates that control the commodity chain. Traders are 
far more diverse, involving key players in sectors that were 
not previously engaged in agriculture, such as car and energy 
companies moving to food and biofuels, and likewise, some 
food companies diversifying into trading of fuel commodities.
Range of consumers. The new character of several crops 
and commodities necessarily expands the spread of their 
consumption, implicating a much wider range of actors. 
Brazilian sugarcane used to be largely linked to consumers 
outside that country through its sweetener products, but 
its expansion into ethanol production has multiplied the 
number of consumers of this crop. Palm oil has consistently 
had a very widespread reach in terms of consumption 
because of its inclusion as basic ingredient for a wide-range 
of products, from chocolates to shampoo to cooking oil. 
But this reach widened even more when it became one of 
the most popular biofuel feedstocks. Thus, long distance, 
de-personalized connections between the production sites 
on the one hand and the consumption sites and the social 
groups therein have become much more dense and far more 
complex—they connect far more people across societies.
Crop-use and land-use change. The rise of flex crops has com-
plicated notions of land-use change. Early discussion among 
activists about biofuels tended to equate production of biofuels 
to land-use change. Indeed, there were, and are, farms that 
were dedicated to food that were converted to produce biofuel 
feedstock, triggering the earlier food-versus-fuel debate (see 
background discussion in Borras and Franco 2012). But the 
current situation is more complicated than this. It seems that 
a significant part of what is happening is more of a “crop-use 
change” than the conventional “land-use change”—but of 
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course the former is intimately linked to the latter. Changing 
the use of a crop means changing the use of the land as well, 
since it changes the ultimate purpose of cultivating the land 
even though the particular plants on the land may not change. 
However, it is useful to analytically separate the two con-
cepts. When much of the corn harvest from the US Midwest 
was converted from feed and food products to ethanol, farm-
ers continued to cultivate the same high-yielding varieties. 
When Indonesian palm oil that was previously produced for 
cooking oil was instead used as biodiesel, it did not require 
any change in the plantation. There are similar stories for 
sugarcane, coconut, soya, sunflower, cassava and others.  
The notion of “crop-use change” can better capture this as-
pect of the rise of flex crops and commodities, rather than the 
conventional notion of land-use change. Still, this has result-
ed from the rise of flex crops being harvested on more land, 
thus understanding land-use change is also still important.
As above, when US corn cultivation was increased and 
shifted to ethanol production, US soya cultivation fell and 
Brazilian soya cultivation rose to fill the gap. In this way, 
crop-use changes created a market gap and thus stimu-
lated land-use change elsewhere. Often this means land 
clearing for crop monocultures, which causes more social 
and environmental harm than a change from one crop to 
another. This indirect land-use change (ILUC) has become 
the focus of advocacy campaigns against biofuel expansion. 
And similar harm may likewise result from other changes 
like shifting crops or land to animal feed. 
The role of the state. Institutional factors also facilitate, 
hinder, encourage or discourage key actors in exploiting 
the potential multiple-ness and flexible-ness of these crops 
and commodities. Some options are framed and pushed 
strategically by the state, e.g. by creating a favourable 
investment climate, land laws, trade policies and agreements, 
biofuels mandatory blending laws, climate change mitigation 
strategies, taxation, labour laws, foreign ownership laws 
or subsidies. These are among some of the main variables 
that facilitate or block the efforts of key actors to harness 
the potential multiple-ness and flexible-ness of crops and 
commodities. In addition, the global land rush that has 
accompanied the rise of flex crops and commodities could 
not have proceeded smoothly, effectively and widely without 
the central and critical role played by the state in terms of 
legal and political justification, definition, quantification, 
identification, appropriation and disposition of lands needed 
by investors that are legally claimed by the state. This is 
especially so because investors mainly target public/state 
lands precisely because they can be acquired at low cost and 
deals can be facilitated relatively easily by the state as a willing 
partner. Hence, despite the neoliberal call for the retreat 
of the state, the latter seems to be called back to carry out 
institutional reforms to harness the potential of flex crops and 
commodities in capital accumulation. (see Wolford et al. 2013).
International regulatory institutions. There are multiple 
regulatory institutions, instruments and principles that 
have evolved alongside the expansion of the production and 
consumption of some crops and commodities. These global 
governance instruments range from obligatory governmental 
instruments or principles such as human rights instruments 
and the free, prior, informed consent (FPIC) to voluntary 
codes of conduct under the umbrella of corporate social 
responsibility (see Margulis et al. 2013 for a comprehensive 
analytical background). In the latter especially, we have 
witnessed the proliferation of sectoral voluntary standards, 
including the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), 
the Roundtable for Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) and the 
Roundtable for Sustainable Soya (RSS), among others. In 
addition to FPIC, probably the most popular of governmental 
instruments is the Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (TGs), 
popularly perceived by civil society organizations as an 
instrument that is closer to an obligatory type than a voluntary 
one despite the label. The challenge for researchers, social 
movement activists and policy experts is to understand the 
ways in, and the extent to, which the rise of flex crops and 
commodities—and the corresponding dynamic and fluid 
commodity flows across sites of production, circulation 
and consumption—might undermine the efficacy of a 
sectoral approach to governance, because of the far more 
interlocking multi-sectoral nature of the phenomenon.
IMPLICATIONS FOR  
FUTURE RESEARCH  
AND (TRANS)NATIONAL 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS’  
POLICY ADVOCACY  
AND CAMPAIGNS 
The multiple-ness and flexible-ness of particular crops and 
commodities are crucial concepts for our understanding of the 
emerging politics around key crops and commodities in the 
changing global agrarian context. We still have little empirical 
knowledge about this matter. We know just enough to make us 
confident that this is something worth further empirical inves-
tigation, further theorizing and jump-starting political debates.
In terms of research, there are challenging big questions that 
can direct future studies, including the following: What are the 
material bases for, and policy narratives underpinning the new 
multiple uses and multiple flexible uses of which crops and 
commodities? What is the actual configuration of the political 
economic requirement for flexing, namely, material basis, 
available technology and profit viability of key crops and com-
modities, including sugarcane, soya, palm oil, corn, sunflower, 
cassava, sugar beet, coconut and fast growing trees? What 
is the actual extent of crop and commodity flexing in each of 
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these sectors? How does flexing actually happen? Who are 
the key players who decide how to read signals for flexing 
and when, where and how to flex? What real-life changes (in 
resource property control, land and water use, production 
systems and so on) result from anticipated and/or imagined 
flexing in key crops and commodities? Who are the key players 
involved in anticipated and/or imagined flexing? When, where 
and how do they deploy these types of strategies? Who are 
the old and new corporate, financial and state actors involved 
in the emerging complex of flex crops and commodities, and 
why and how did they decide to engage in this new complex? 
Is finance capital biased towards particular flex crops? If so, 
why, and how does this bias (re)shape agrarian structures and 
land-use practices? How are the working classes—located 
in the sites of production, circulation and consumption of flex 
crops and commodities, rural and urban, in southern and 
northern countries—impacted positively and/or negatively by 
this emerging phenomenon? What is the role of the state in 
facilitating the rise of flex crops and commodities—especially 
in facilitating the more flexible use of non-food biomass? 
 
There are equally challenging questions for activists, 
including the following: What are the implications of the rise 
of a global flex crop complex for the way we frame (trans)
national social movement campaigns for policy reforms? 
This is an important question because conventional sectoral 
campaigning has become relatively weak and problematic. 
The multiple-ness and flexible-ness of key crops and 
commodities are only somewhat addressed by campaigning 
against palm oil framed within an anti-biofuels campaign, or 
campaigning against soya in the context of livestock sector, 
or campaigning against biofuels by implicating popular feed-
stocks such as sugarcane, palm oil and soya, and so on.8 
The rise of flex crops has validated even more the rele-
vance and importance of transnational social movements 
that can connect national movements across borders. 
But are transnational social movements (agrarian, food, 
environmental, labour and human rights movements) 
able to adjust their issue analysis and demand-making 
to capture the changing and fluid nature of flex crops, 
and if so, how, to what extent and is it effective? 
These are some of the initial challenging questions that 
engaged researchers and activists have to grapple with. 
There are no ready and clear answers. But the first nec-
essary step is to carry out empirical research involving 
engaged academics and social movement activists who 
can break through the silos of agricultural sectors and 
academic disciplines—towards a more multi-sectoral, 
inter-disciplinary collaborative action-research by aca-
demic-activists around this issue. We do not want to simply 
(re)interpret the world in various ways, but also to change 
it in favour of the exploited classes and social groups.
The content of this Publication maybe quoted or reproduced provided that the source is acknowledged. Transnational Institute would appreciate 
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1 In mid-2014, TNI started the Think Piece Series on Flex Crops  
& Commodities. There are about six or seven pre-identified and 
invited papers to jump-start this series. But we envision this 
series to become an open platform and venue for brainstorming 
and discussion by activists and engaged academics towards 
a better understanding of the concept and phenomenon 
of flex crops and commodities. We therefore hope that the 
series will continue beyond the first few papers we have. For 
anyone interested in submitting a paper for this series, please 
get in touch with any member of the TNI Agrarian Justice 
Program. This is a peer reviewed think piece series.
2 Borras is a TNI Fellow and teaches at the International 
Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague. Franco is 
the Coordinator of TNI’s Agrarian Justice Program. Borras 
and Franco are Adjunct Professors at China Agricultural 
University in Beijing. Isakson is an Assistant Professor at the 
University of Toronto. Levidow is a Senior Research Fellow 
at the Open University, UK. Vervest is Coordinator of the 
Economic Justice Program of TNI. We would like to thank the 
participants in the flex crops workshop organized by TNI in 
January 2014 in ISS in The Hague for their critical and useful 
comments on an earlier incomplete version of this paper.
3 The conceptual discussion draws from the very initial 
and highly abbreviated exploration of the notion of 
flex crops in Borras, Franco, Gomez, Kay and Spoor, 
2012, Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(3-4).
4 See, for example, McCarthy et al. (2012).
5 Source: World Bank Global Economic Monitor – Commodities  
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/
selectvariables.aspx?source=Global-Economic-Monitor-
(GEM)-Commodities (Accessed on May 12, 2014). These 
are all of the flex crops for which data is available. 
6 Agricultural derivatives have also been promoted as a means 
of managing risk (Breger Bush 2012).  Interestingly, farmers 
have been very reluctant to sell agricultural derivatives 
or purchase micro-insurance, leading economists to 
question their “irrational” behavior (Da Costa 2014, and 
personal communication with Sarah Martin 2014).  
7 The investors were promised 100,000 ha of land by the 
government; they managed to get ahold of about 60,000 ha.
8 Looking beyond any specific crop, since 2009 European NGOs 
and their Southern counterparts have focused on indirect 
land-use change (ILUC) as a way to criticize the EU’s 10 per 
cent biofuel target. Highlighting various harms from biofuels, 
NGOs proposed extra criteria to account for ILUC (see above; 
Levidow, 2013). In 2012 the European Commission proposed a 
5 per cent limit on food crops counting towards the EU target, 
but the proposal was blocked by conflicts among member states, 
so the NGOs’ campaign strategy has not made any tangible 
difference. Meanwhile other crop-use and land-use changes have 
been causing harm similar to biofuel use of crops. If techno-
scientific developments open up more flexible uses of non-food 
biomass, then this will further blur any distinction between types 
and uses of crops—a shift that warrants critical attention.
Endnotes
TNI Think Piece Series  
on Flex Crops & Commodities
The convergence of multiple crises (food, energy and fuel, 
climate and financial) in the midst of the rise of newer hubs 
of global capital (BRICS countries and some middle income 
countries) – and the various responses to these by states and 
corporations – have paved the way for the emergence of ‘flex 
crops and commodities’. Flex crops and commodities are those 
that have multiple and/or flexible uses: food, animal feed, fuel, 
and other commercial-industrial uses. In fact the contemporary 
global land rush is intertwined with the rise of flex crops and 
commodities: sites of large-scale land deals tend to be sites of 
expansion of production of these crops and commodities, e.g. 
soya, sugarcane, palm oil, corn, cassava, industrial trees. What 
are the implications of this phenomenon for how scholars, civil 
society and grassroots social movements undertake ‘engaged 
research’, public actions and policy advocacy around agrarian 
justice issues? The issues are compelling and urgent, yet still 
largely under-researched. TNI is launching the TNI Think Piece 
Series on Flex Crops & Commodities to jump-start collabora-
tive action and a critical dialogue between engaged academics, 
civil society and grassroots movement activists on this issue. 
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AGRARIAN JUSTICE PROGRAMME
In recent years, various  actors, from big foreign 
and domestic corporate business and finance to 
governments,  have initiated a large-scale worldwide 
enclosure of agricultural lands, mostly in the Global 
South but also elsewhere. This is done for large-scale 
industrial and industrial agriculture ventures and 
often packaged as large-scale investment for rural 
development. But rather than being investment that is 
going to benefit the majority of rural people, especially 
the poorest and most vulnerable, this process 
constitutes a new wave of land and water ‘grabbing’. 
It is a global phenomenon whereby the access, use 
and right to land and other closely associated natural 
resources is being taken over - on a large-scale  
and/or by large-scale capital – resulting in a cascade 
of negative impacts on rural livelihoods and ecologies, 
human rights, and local food security. 
In this context TNI aims to contribute to strengthening 
the campaigns by agrarian social movements in order 
to make them more effective in resisting land and 
water grabbing; and in developing and advancing 
alternatives such as land/food/water sovereignty  
and agro-ecological farming systems.
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This discussion paper offers a preliminary exploration of the concept 
and phenomenon of “flex crops and commodities”, building on an 
earlier and initial analysis and abbreviated idea put forward by 
some of the authors of this paper. We discuss the dual concepts of 
the “multiple-ness” and “flexible-ness” of crops and commodities 
as two distinct but intertwined dimensions of some key crops and 
commodities. These key crops and commodities are shaped by the 
changing global context that is itself (re)moulded in large part 
by the convergence of multiple crises and the various responses 
to those crises. Building on these dual concepts, we will identify 
and explain the minimum requirements for crop and commodity 
flexing. We will also try to typologize the various types of crop and 
commodity flexing, namely, “real flexing”, “anticipated/speculated 
flexing”, and “imagined flexing”—to allow for a deeper examination 
of these interrelated processes. The boundaries between these 
categories (multiple/flexible, real, anticipated and imagined) are not 
always clearly demarcated, requiring us to examine the issue of flex 
crops and commodities in a more interlinked manner. We will focus 
our initial exploration on the political dynamics of such interactions 
and intersections, looking into the factors that encourage or 
discourage, facilitate or hinder maximization of the “multiple-
ness” and/or “flexible-ness” of particular crops and commodities. 
Finally, and as a way of closing, we will outline the implications 
of these dynamics for how we think of engaged research, public 
actions and policy advocacy, including a brief discussion of what 
we call “flex policy narratives” by governments and corporations.
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